Logic locking is used to protect integrated circuits (ICs) from piracy and counterfeiting. An encrypted IC implements correct function only when the right key is input. Many existing logic locking methods are subject to the powerful satisfiability (SAT)-based attack. Recently, an Anti-SAT scheme has been developed. By adopting two complementary logic blocks that consist of AND/NAND trees, it makes the number of iterations needed by the SAT attack exponential to the number of input bits. Nevertheless, the Anti-SAT scheme is vulnerable to the later AppSAT and removal attacks. This paper proposes a generalized (G-)Anti-SAT scheme. Different from the Anti-SAT scheme, a variety of complementary or non-complementary functions can be adopted for the two blocks in our G-Anti-SAT scheme. Pairs of functions that consist of similar number of minterms can be chosen to resist the AppSAT and removal attacks. Meanwhile, our design requires the same number of iterations in the SAT attack as the Anti-SAT scheme, and hence is always resistant to the SAT attack. The Anti-SAT scheme is just a special case of our proposed design.
INTRODUCTION
N OWADAYS, integrated circuits (ICs) are designed and produced in a multi-vendor environment, which makes the designs face various security threats. In particular, nestlists of the ICs may be obtained from reverse engineering or untrusted foundries. IP piracy and counterfeiting cause severe economic loss to the IC designers [1] , [2] . IC camouflaging [3] [4] resists reverse engineering [5] by making functionally different logic gates look alike in layout. However, unlike logic encryption/locking [6] , it is ineffective when the netlist is available. The basic idea of logic locking is to insert key-controlled logic gates into the chip so that the chip does not function correctly without the right key.
Many logic locking schemes have been developed previously by inserting XOR/XNOR gates [7] - [9] , MUX gates [10] , [11] , or look-up tables (LUTs) [12] , [13] controlled by keys. However, these designs can be easily decrypted by the satisfiability (SAT)-based attack [14] , which uses Boolean SAT solvers to iteratively update and solve the conjunctive normal form (CNF) formula of the target circuit. In each iteration, a distinguishing input pattern (DIP) is found and it is utilized to identify wrong keys. For many logic locking schemes, only a small number of DIPs are needed to identify all wrong keys. As a result, the SAT attack can be done within a few hours even if the key size is not very large.
Several schemes have been proposed to resist the SAT attack in recent years [15] , [16] . The main idea is to adopt functional blocks that make the number of iterations in the SAT attack exponential. The Anti-SAT design [15] consists of two complementary function blocks implementing NAND/AND trees. The SAT attack excludes a disjoint set of wrong keys in each iteration and needs to go through all possible input patterns as DIPs before the right key is derived. In SarLock [16] , the function blocks are designed so that each DIP can only exclude at most one wrong key. When the number of key bits is larger than the number of input bits, the SAT attack has to enumerate all input patterns. The ideas in the Anti-SAT and SarLock schemes are quite similar, and the following discussions focus on the Anti-SAT scheme.
The Anti-SAT scheme is vulnerable to more recent attacks. AND/NAND functions are adopted in the two blocks of the Anti-SAT scheme to make the number of iterations needed in the SAT attack exponential. On the other hand, such functions lead to large skew in the output signal, which makes the Anti-SAT design subject to the removal attack [17] . Additionally, for a randomly selected wrong key, only a small number of input patterns make the Anti-SAT output incorrect. As a result, it can be decrypted by the AppSAT attack [18] . This paper proposes a generalized (G-) Anti-SAT scheme. The proposed scheme is resistant to not only the SAT attack like the Anti-SAT design in [15] , but also the AppSAT and removal attacks. The Anti-SAT design is just a special case of the proposed G-Anti-SAT scheme. From our analysis, it was discovered that the wrong key sets that can be identified by the DIPs do not have to be disjoint as in the Anti-SAT and SarLock designs in order to make the SAT attack run through exponentially large number of iterations. From this key observation, a variety of logic functions can be used for the two function blocks and they do not have to be complementary. As a result, proper functions can be chosen to effectively reduce the skews of the signals to be resistant to the removal attack and increase the corruptibility of the output signals to be immune to the AppSAT attack. The major contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) Generalized constraints on the two blocks of functions that make the number of the SAT attack iterations exponential to the key size are derived. 2) Generalization is made in a second dimension to allow the two functions to be non-complementary. Constraints on the existence of correct keys for this case are derived.
3) Methodologies are developed to design functions satisfying the generalized constraints using K-maps. 4) Guidelines are provided to develop designs that are resistant to AppSAT and removal attacks and have reduced logic complexity.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background of the attacks and Anti-SAT design. Section 3 proposes our G-Anti-SAT constraints. Section 4 presents methodologies for developing functions satisfying the G-Anti-SAT constraints using K-maps. Guidelines for resisting removal and AppSAT attacks and reducing logic complexity are also discussed in this section. Analysis and experimental results showing the resistance of our design to various attacks are given in Section 5. Discussions and conclusions follow in Section 6 and Section 7, respectively.
BACKGROUND
This section introduces basic knowledge about the SAT attack, Anti-SAT block, AppSAT and removal attack.
SAT attack
The SAT attack [14] is a powerful technique against logic locking. The attack model assumes that the attacker has access to the locked gate-level netlist, which can be obtained by reverse engineering or from an un-trusted foundry. Define the locked netlist as Y = f e ( X, K) with primary inputs X, key inputs K, and primary outputs Y . Its CNF formula is represented as C e ( X, K, Y ). It is also assumed that the attacker has an activated chip. Its netlist is represented as
The SAT attack finds the right key by excluding all wrong keys through utilizing DIPs. Initially, a SAT solver is applied to the following formula
to solve for an X that leads to different outputs, Y 1 and Y 2 , under two different keys, K 1 and K 2 . This X is referred to as the DIP and is denoted by X d 1 . Then the logic function of the activated circuit is utilized to get the corresponding correct output
. After that, new constraints corresponding to X d 1 and Y d 1 are added and the original SAT formula in (1) is updated as
. Then the updated SAT formula is solved for DIPs and the DIPs are utilized to update the SAT formula iteratively. In the ith iteration, the SAT formula is
If F i is satisfiable, then there exist at least one pair of keys K 1 , K 2 , and X d i+1 such that f e ( X d i+1 , K 1 ) = f e ( X d i+1 , K 2 ), which means not all wrong keys have been excluded from the key space. When the SAT formula is no longer satisfiable in an iteration, say λ, the algorithm stops. At this time, the correct key can be derived by solving the following SAT formula
Anti-SAT block
An Anti-SAT block is proposed in [15] . It is composed of two complementary functions g andḡ as shown in Fig. 1 . These two functions share the same input X but have different keys. The outputs of the two functions can be ANDed or ORed to generate the output as shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively. They are referred to as the type-0 and type-1 blocks, respectively. Let K 1 = [k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k n ] and K 2 = [k n+1 , k n+2 , · · · , k 2n ]. Any K 1 = K 2 are correct keys for the Anti-SAT scheme. Since g andḡ are complementary functions, the correct output of the type-0 block in Fig. 1(a) is '0', and that of the type-1 block in Fig. 1 
The input to the g function in Fig. 1 
In the remainder of this paper, L T is referred to as the true set. In [15] , it has been derived that the total number of iterations needed by the SAT attack on the structure shown in Fig. 1 is lower bounded by
When p = 1 or 2 n − 1, λ ≥ 2 n . Since there are 2 n input combinations, this means that all possible input patterns need to be gone through as DIPs to reveal the correct keys and the SAT attack is effectively resisted. A natural candidate for g that satisfies p = 1 or p = 2 n − 1 is the AND or NAND of all inputs. Two methods have been proposed in [15] to integrate the Anti-SAT block into a circuit: random integration and secure integration. They use random signals in the circuit and primary inputs of the circuit, respectively, as the inputs to the Anti-SAT block. Unlike the random integration, the secure integration guarantees that the number of iterations needed by the SAT attack is maximized.
AppSAT attack
In the AppSAT attack [18] , the corruptibility of the output signal is defined as
where X and K are the sets of all possible input and key patterns, respectively. The Anti-SAT block in Fig. 1 has one output signal. This signal is connected to the circuit to be locked and the locked circuit functions correctly if this signal has the correct value. Since g and g are n-input AND and NAND gates, respectively, for every wrong key, there is only one input pattern that makes the output of the Anti-SAT block wrong. Accordingly, the Anti-SAT design has low corruptibility.
The AppSAT attack avoids exponential number of iterations by introducing random query reinforcement and stopping the query process early. After every certain number of iterations, random input query patterns are inserted and additional constraints from the random queries are added to the CNF formula. If the output has low corruptibility, the portion of the input queries that generate the wrong output falls below a threshold. If this happens for a number of rounds, the algorithm terminates and returns an approximate key.
Removal attack
The removal attack [17] can be utilized to identify the last gate, G, in the Anti-SAT block. Then the output of this gate is replaced by the correct signal, which is '0' and '1' for the type-0 and type-1 blocks, respectively, in the circuit adopting the Anti-SAT block.
The removal attack is carried out using signal probability skew (SPS). The SPS value of a signal, x, is defined as
Since 0 ≤ P r[x = 1] ≤ 1, the range of s x is [−0.5, 0.5]. For a logic gate with two inputs whose SPS values are s 1 and s 2 , its absolute difference (ADS) value is defined as
Assuming that X, K 1 , K 2 are random. Then the SPS values of the inputs to the XOR gates in the Anti-SAT block are zero. According to (6) , the outputs of the XOR gates have zero SPS values. The SPS value for the output of an n-input AND gate is calculated as s n−AN D = n i=1 (0.5 + s i ) − 0.5, where s i is the SPS of the i th input. Since s i = 0 for the AND gate in the g function, s g( X, K1) = 0.5 n − 0.5. As n → ∞, s g( X, K1) ≈ −0.5. Similarly, for the n-input NAND gate output from g, the SPS is s g( X, K2) = 0.5 − 0.5 n . It approaches 0.5 for large n. As a result, for the last gate, G, of the Anti-SAT block in Fig. 1(a) , the output SPS value is -0.5 and ADS value of final gate G is ADS G = |s g( X, K1) − s g( X, K2) | ≈ 1, if the number of inputs to the Anti-SAT block is large.
It was found in [17] that the ADS values for the gates in a circuit are rarely very high. Hence the G gate may be identified by first sorting out the gates with the highest ADS values. In the case that there are multiple candidates whose ADS values are very close, the transitive fan-in (TFI) of the candidate gates are analyzed. The TFI traces back the inputs of the candidate gates and finds how many key bits contribute to the inputs. The G gate should have all 2n key bits as contributors. To remove the G gate, its output signal is replaced by 0 or 1 in the circuit when the SPS of G is negative or positive, respectively.
It was also mentioned in [17] that the removal and AppSAT attack can be combined. The combined attack can return an exact unlocked netlist, instead of an approximate key when using the AppSAT attack alone.
GENERALIZED ANTI-SAT CONSTRAINTS
The main reason that the Anti-SAT block is subject to the AppSAT and removal attacks is that, p, the cardinality of the true set as defined in (3), is either too small or too big. On the other hand, such p is needed in the Anti-SAT design to maximize the number of iterations in the SAT attack. To solve this dilemma, true sets that have medium cardinality and at the same time lead to maximum SAT attack iterations are necessary. In this section, generalized constraints on the true sets for resisting the SAT attack are proposed. Our generalization allows a wide range of true set cardinality, which enables our design to be effectively resistant to the AppSAT and removal attacks at the same time.
Wrong key sets analysis
Define WK Xi as the wrong key set that input X i can exclude. In other words,
and the algorithm has already selected one of them as a DIP, then the other one will not be a DIP in the rest of the SAT attack. Therefore, if a circuit can be decrypted by the SAT attack in a limited number of iterations, there must be many inputs that have the same wrong key sets and are not selected as DIPs.
Consider a circuit that has n inputs and requires λ iterations in the SAT attack. Denote the set of DIPs by X DIP . Accordingly, λ = |X DIP |. If a block needs to be resistant to the SAT attack, λ needs to be as big as possible, which is 2 n . This means that each possible n-bit input combination can exclude some unique wrong keys that the other inputs cannot exclude. Take a 4-bit-input type-0 Anti-SAT block as an example. When p in (3) is 1, for each possible input X, |WK X | = 15. The key input has 8 bits and hence 2 8 different combinations. From [15] , 16 of the keys are correct. Hence, the total number of wrong keys is 2 8 − 16 = 240. Therefore, the number of DIPs and the number of iterations carried out by the SAT attack should be λ ≥ 240 15 = 16. On the other hand, for 4-bit input, there are 2 4 combinations. Hence, λ = 16. Apparently, for this Anti-SAT scheme, the wrong key sets for different input combinations do not have any overlap. In other words,
where X n is the set of all possible inputs of n bits. λ may still be made equal to 2 n to be resistant to the SAT attack even if there are overlaps among the wrong key sets. The Anti-SAT block is a special case. In addition, the functions of the two blocks do not have to be complementary of each other as in the Anti-SAT block.
Highlights of proposed generalized Anti-SAT block
The proposed G-Anti-SAT block generalizes the previous approach by allowing the wrong key sets of different input 
In other words, each wrong key set has at least one distinct element. Adopting the above relaxation, there are still λ = 2 n DIPs. Hence, our generalized design is still resistant to the SAT attack. In order to allow overlapping wrong key sets, the cardinality of the true set |L T | is relaxed so that it can be integers other than 1 or 2 n − 1. A second dimension of generalization is done by allowing the two functions to be f and g, which are not necessarily complementary of each other. By choosing true sets with medium cardinality, our design leads to output with high corruptibility and hence is resistant to the AppSAT attack. Also the ADS value of the final gate in our scheme can be tuned by changing the cardinalities of the true sets of f and g. By using two functions whose true set cardinalities are as close to each other as possible, our design is immune to the removal attack, which is not addressable by the previous Anti-SAT block. Similarly, our proposed design can be also integrated into circuits using the methods in [15] . In the following, subsection 3.3.1 analyzes the constraints on the true sets to satisfy (9) . When noncomplementary blocks are adopted, it is non-trivial to identify the right keys. The constraint to ensure the existence of right keys is provided in Subsection 3.3.2. Section 4 presents construction methods for the true sets by using K-maps. Kmaps help to not only highlight the constraints need to be satisfied but also identify the truth sets leading to lower hardware implementation complexity for the proposed G-Anti-SAT block. Fig. 2 shows our proposed G-Anti-SAT block for type-0 design. Different from the previous design, the functions of the two blocks do not have to be complementary of each other. Similarly, the last gate can be replaced by an OR gate to be a type-1 design. In the following, analysis is carried out on the type-0 design shown in Fig. 2 . All the proposed analysis and constraints can be extended easily for the type-1 design.
Constraints for SAT attack resistance and correct key existence

Constraints for resisting SAT attacks
Define
Following the convention in [15] , '1' is considered as the incorrect output for a type-0 block. For the architecture in Fig. 2 , the output function is
, where K f and K g are the key inputs of block f and g,
where || means concatenation. Accordingly, (9) can be interpreted as
X can be also rewritten as the sum of two elements in X n , i.e.
is not true. Therefore, to satisfy the constraints in (11), Lf T and Lg T need to be designed jointly so that
Define the binary distance between two vectors X 1 and X 2 as d = X 1 ⊕ X 2 . Let D e−S be a set consisting of binary distances between an element e ∈ S and all the other elements in S. In other words,
Then
Accordingly, the constraints in (11) are translated to
The above equation gives constraints equivalent to (9) . On the other hand, these constraints can be utilized to construct Lf T and Lg T more easily. They are referred to as Constraint 1 in the reminder of this paper.
From Constraint 1, it is clear that the functions f and g do not have to be complementary, and |Lf T |, |Lg T | do not need to be 1 or 2 n −1. Therefore, the f and g blocks do not need to be AND and NAND gates, respectively, as in the Anti-SAT block [15] . The Anti-SAT block is just a special case of our proposed design. Many different functions can be chosen for f and g. In the design of f and g, an arbitrary set can be chosen as Lf T first. For the selected Lf T , the choice of Lg T may not be unique. Any Lg T satisfying Constraint 1 can be utilized to be resistant to the SAT attack.
Example 1 Take the structure in Fig. 2 with 4-bit input as an example. Different from the previous design, the f and g functions are allowed to be non-complementary. First, let Lf T = [0, 1, 2, 3]. To simplify the notations, decimal numbers are used to represent vectors here. It turns out [0, 8, 9, 11, 10] is one of the possible sets for Lg T that makes Constraint 1 satisfied. When − − → Lf T i = − − → Lg T j = 0, the two sets in Constraint 1 are disjoint. For a given Lf T , the corresponding Lg T , − − → Lf T i , and − − → Lg T j satisfying Constraint 1 can be found easily using K-maps, which will be detailed in Section 4. Lf T and Lg T are the minterms of the f and g functions, respectively. The logic formula for f and g can be derived easily. For the above choice of Lf T and Lg T , f ( L) = l 3 ∧ l 2 and g( L) = (l 3 ∧ l 2 ) ∨ (l 2 ∧ l 1 ∧ l 0 ), where L = [l 3 , l 2 , l 1 , l 0 ] is the 4-bit input to f and g.
Example 2
The f and g in our design can be complementary as well. Select Lg T = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7] and Lf T = [6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . It can be found that Lf T i = 5 and Lg T j = 6 satisfy Constraint 1. Accordingly, the functions f and g are derived as f ( L) = l 3 ∨ (l 2 ∧ l 1 ∧ l 0 ) and g( L) = f ( L).
Example 3 Constrain 1 is not sufficient to guarantee the existence of correct keys. For example, take Lf T = [0, 1, 3, 2] and Lg T = [0, 4, 12, 8] . Constraint 1 is also satisfied by taking
. Accordingly, f ( L) = l 3 ∧ l 2 and g( L) = l 1 ∧ l 0 . However in this case, from exhaustive search, there does not exist a correct key K * such that f e ( X, K * ) = f o ( X) for every possible X.
Constraints for existence of correct keys
When f and g are not complementary, additional constraints need to be introduced to guarantee the existence of correct keys.
For a type-0 structure like that in Fig. 2 , the final gate is an AND gate and the correct output is '0'. Hence, correct keys are [ K f || K g ] such that for every X ∈ X n , f ( X⊕ K f ) = 0 or g(
There are two cases to consider for functions f and g:
Hence, any K f = K g are correct keys. In the second case, for a selected function f , a function g can be designed to satisfy (14) . From the definition, Lf T ∪ Lf F = X n and Lf T ∩ Lf F = ∅. Hence, for any K f , Lf F K f ∪ Lf T K f = X n . In the case that f and g are not complementary, if Lg F Kg ⊇ Lf T K f , then (14) would be satisfied. Define the binary distance structure of a set S as
It was found that to make Lg F Kg ⊇ Lf T K f , Lg F should have a subset with the same binary distance structure as Lf T . In other words,
The proof is detailed in the appendix. Let us use Constraint 2 to check whether correct keys exist for Example 1 and 3 in the last subsection. 1) In Example 1, Lf T = [0, 1, 2, 3] and Lg T = [0, 8, 9, 11, 10] . From (15) , it can be computed that D Lf T = [1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1] . The subset S of Lg F that have the same binary structure with Lf T can be [12, 13, 14, 15] . D S = [1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1]. Hence, this block has right keys. The method to find the right keys will be presented in Section 4. It can be found that one of the right keys is K f = [0, 0, 0, 0] and K g = [0, 0, 0, 1] 2) In Example 3, f ( L) = l 0 ∧ l 1 and g( L) = l 2 ∧ l 3 . It can be calculated that D Lf T = [1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1]. However, there is no subset of D Lg F having the same binary structure as Lf T . Hence correct key does not exist.
The proposed constraints for type-0 block can be easily extended to design type-1 G-Anti-SAT blocks. For type-1 blocks, Constraint 1 and 2 should be modified as
GENERALIZED ANTI-SAT BLOCK DESIGN USING K-MAPS
This section proposes methods for designing the true sets for type-0 blocks that satisfy Constraint 1, 2 and finding correct keys. The proposed methods are developed using K-maps. The elements in the true sets are mapped to the cells in the K-map. Accordingly, designing the true sets is translated to grouping the cells in the K-map. Whether the constraints are satisfied can be easily observed from the K-map. Also K-maps help to design blocks with lower logic complexity. The proposed design approaches can be extended similarly for type-1 blocks.
K-map cell selection for non-complementary functions
Let us first focus on the case that the functions f and g are non-complementary. Consider the G-Anti-SAT block in Fig.  2 with 4-bit input L = [l 3 , l 2 , l 1 , l 0 ] to f and g as an example. The corresponding K-map has 16 cells represented as a 4 × 4 array. l 3 l 2 and l 1 l 0 are used to label the columns and rows, respectively, as shown in Fig. 3 . label of a cell to the labels of each of the other cells leads to a set of distinct labels. Accordingly, a random cell, such as the dark gray one in Fig. 3(a) , can be chosen as the cell
Then Lf T and Lg T can be formed by including non-overlapping cells among the rest cells. Also Lf T and Lg T do not need to cover all the cells.
When f and g are non-complementary, additional constraints need to be added to K-map cell selection in order to satisfy Constraint 2 and hence have correct keys. Without loss of generality, consider that Lf T consists of at most half of the cells in the K-map. For the common cell shown in Fig. 3(a) , randomly select cells in the left half of the Kmap to be Lf T , such as those shown in Fig. 3(a) . Two symmetric groups of cells in the K-map always have the same binary distance structure defined in (12) . One example of the group of cells that is symmetric to those for the Lf T in Fig. 3(a) is shown in Fig. 3(b) . Having Lg F include at least the symmetric cells in Fig. 3(b) would satisfy Constraint 2. On the other hand, Lg T covers all the other cells not covered by Lg F and can only share one common cell with Lf T . Therefore, Lg F also needs to cover every cell in Lf T except the common cell. For the Lf T selected in Fig. 3(a) , Fig. 3(c) shows the Lg F satisfying these requirements. The rest cells, as shown in Fig. 3(d) , form Lg T satisfying Constraint 1 and 2. It should be noted that there may exist other choices of Lf T and Lg T satisfying Constraint 1 and 2 besides the ones can be located by using the above method.
The correct keys K f and K g can be easily decided from the cells for Lf F and Lg F in the K-map. Constraint 2 is equivalent to (14) . In the K-map, the group of cells for Lf F K f has the same shape as that for Lf F , except that it is shifted and/or flipped according to the K f vector. Similarly, the group of cells for Lg F Kg is that for Lg F shifted and/or flipped according to K g . Then (14) is translated to that the shifted and/or flipped groups for Lf F and Lg F 00 01 11 10 00 01 11 10 l3l2 l1l0 (a) (b) 00 01 11 10 00 01 11 10 l3l2 l1l0 Fig. 3(a) , Fig. 4(a) shows the cells for the corresponding Lf F . The cells for Lg F are illustrated in Fig. 3(c) . It can be seen that the union of such Lg F and Lf F covers every cell in the K-map except the one with [l 3 , l 2 , l 1 , l 0 ] = [0, 1, 1, 1], which is the common cell. One way to cover each cell in the K-map is to keep the cells for Lg F unchanged, which means K g = [0, 0, 0, 0], and use K f = [1, 0, 0, 0], which leads to the group of cells of Lf F K f shown in Fig. 4(b) . The gray cells in Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 4(b) are Lg F Kg with K g = [0, 0, 0, 0] and Lf F K f with K f = [1, 0, 0, 0], respectively. They cover all cells in the K-map. There are many choices of K f and K g that satisfy (14) . Another example is that K g = [1, 0, 0, 0] and K f = [0, 0, 0, 0]. It corresponds to that the Lf F in Fig. 4(a) is unchanged and the Lg F in Fig. 3(c) is flipped horizontally in the K-map.
K-map cell selection for complementary functions
When f and g are complementary, Lf T and Lg T should not have any common cells and should cover all the cells in the K-map. First pick a random column as shown in Fig.  5(a) . This column is referred to as the dividing column in this paper. The labels for each column in the K-map are distinct. Hence, adding the column label of the dividing column to the labels of the other columns results in a set of distinct nonzero vectors. This means that splitting the other columns between Lf T , Lg T and picking − − → Lf T i , − − → Lg T j from the dividing column would satisfy Constraint 1. To reduce the logic complexity of f and g, adjacent columns should be put into Lf T and Lg T , and the numbers of columns in Lf T and Lg T should be as close as possible. For example, in Fig.  5(b) , the first column is put in Lf T and the third and fourth columns are put in Lg T .
Next, the cells in the dividing column should be split between Lf T and Lg T . Put one cell of this column in one set and the others in the other set. Without loss of generality, the one cell is put in Lg T and the other cells are put in Lf T , as shown by the example in Fig. 5(c) . The cell of Lg T in the dividing column can be used as − − → Lg T j and any other cells in the dividing column can be used as − − → Lf T i . The sum of the column labels of any two cells in the same column is zero. Hence, adding − − → Lf T i to any other cells in the dividing column would result in a zero column label, and any vector in
As a result, Lf T and Lg T from such K-map cells splitting satisfy Constraint 1.
When f and g are complementary, any K f = K g can be used as a correct key. Constraint 2 does not need to be considered in this case.
True sets design for complexity reduction and attack resistance
To reduce the implementation complexity, adjacent cells should be put into the two true sets Lf T and Lg T . The larger the number of adjacent cell groups and the smaller the number of groups in the K-map that can be used to cover Lf T and Lg T , the simpler the logic functions f and g.
To increase the corruptibility for App-SAT attack resistance as defined in (5) for a type-0 G-Anti-SAT block, |Lf T | and |Lg T | should not be either very small, such as 1, or very large, such as 2 n − 1. On the other hand, to make the ADS value defined in (7) for the last gate in Fig. 2 close to '0', which is needed to resist the removal attack, Lf T and Lg T should have similar cardinality. These guidelines can be followed to design the f and g blocks. In addition, the ADS of the last gate can be tuned to any value in our design by changing the relative cardinalities of Lf T and Lg T .
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section evaluates the achievable security level of the proposed G-Anti-SAT scheme. Experiments and analyses are carried out to show that the proposed design is resistant to the SAT, AppSAT, and removal attacks. The SAT attack tool in [14] based on Lingeling SAT solver is used in our experiments. The CPU time is limited to 10 hours as in [14] , and the experiments are run over an Intel Core i7 with 4GB RAM. Analysis on the query process of the AppSAT is carried out to show that it is ineffective on our design. The evaluation for the removal attack resistance is done by calculating the ADS values as in [17] .
G-Anti-SAT block example
To compare with the Anti-SAT scheme [15] , inputs with 16 bits are adopted in our G-Anti-SAT block. Two type-0 block examples are evaluated in our experiments.
G-Anti-SAT Block m 1 . This example has noncomplementary f and g. For 16-bit input, the K-map has 2 8 columns and 2 8 rows. The cell in the 64 th column and 170 th row is randomly selected to be the common cell. To minimize the logic complexity and the ADS value for the last gate, all the cells in the first 64 columns are chosen to form Lf T . The last 64 columns have the same binary distance structure as Lf T . Hence Lg F should include at least the first and last 64 columns, except the common cell, in order to satisfy Constraint 2. To make the ADS value of the last gate as close to 0 as possible, Lg T should have about the same number of cells as Lf T . Hence, form Lg F by all the cells in the first 64 columns and last 128 columns except the common cell. Accordingly, Lg T consists of the second 64 columns in the K-map and the common cell. Denote the inputs to the f and g blocks by [l 15 , l 14 , · · · , l 0 ]. It can be derived that f ( L) = l 15 ∧ l 14 , g( L) = (l 15 ∧ l 14 ) ∨ (l 15 ∧ l 13 ∧ l 12 ∧ l 11 ∧ l 10 ∧ l 9 ∧ l 8 ∧ l 7 ∧ l 6 ∧ l 5 ∧ l 4 ∧ l 3 ∧ l 2 ∧ l 1 ∧ l 0 ). Lf F includes all cells in the K-map except the first 64 columns and Lg F contains all cells except the second 64 columns and the common cell. In order to make Lf F K f and Lg F Kg cover every cells in the K-map, one method is to keep the cells of Lg F unchanged, which means K g = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], and use K f = [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] so that the cells in Lg F Kg cover the forth, first, and second groups of 64 columns.
G-Anti-SAT Block m 2 . Complementary f and g functions are considered in this example. First, pick the 128 th column in the K-map as the dividing column. To reduce the logic complexity, put the first 127 columns into Lf T and the 128 columns on the right side into Lg T . One cell in the dividing column should be put into one true set and the rest cells should be put into the other set. Without loss of generality, the last cell in this column is separated from the others. To make the cardinalities of Lf T and Lg T as close as possible in order to resist the removal attack, the last cell of the dividing column is put into Lg T and the other cells in this column are included in Lf T . Accordingly, g( L) = l 15 ∨(l 14 ∧l 13 ∧l 12 ∧l 11 ∧l 10 ∧l 9 ∧l 8 ∧l 7 ∧l 6 ∧l 5 ∧l 4 ∧l 3 ∧l 2 ∧l 1 ∧l 0 ) and f ( L) = g( L).
SAT attack resistance analysis
The SAT attack is applied to decrypt the proposed G-Anti-SAT blocks, and the number of iterations and time are listed in Table 1 for the designs with different numbers of input bits. For comparison, the Anti-SAT block is also simulated in the same hardware environment and the results are included in Table 1 . It can be seen that our design achieves the same resistance to the SAT attack in terms of the number of iterations. The reason that the time consumed by the attack on the non-complementary G-Anti-SAT block is less than those of complementary G-Anti-SAT and Anti-SAT blocks is because that the non-complementary design has less complicated logic. As a result, the complexity to construct and solve the corresponding CNF formula is lower. Fig. 6 shows the logic diagram of block m 1 . Assume that each input is equal to '1' with probability 0.5. Using (6) and (7) , the ADS value for each gate in Fig. 6 can be computed. The ADS value for the last gate, G, is 0.00001. Hence, our design is resistant to the removal attack. The five gates with the largest ADS values in block m 1 are listed in Table  2 and they are around 0.5. When the Anti-SAT block is incorporated into circuits, there are many gates with ADS values in a wide range and many of them are larger than 0.5. Hence, the gates in Table 2 can not be identified by examining the ADS values either. The logic diagram of block m 2 is shown in Fig. 7 . The largest ADS values of all gates in Fig. 7 are listed in Table  3 . Similar to block m 1 , the ADS value of the last gate is around 0 and the largest five ADS values are also around 0.5 in block m 2 . As a result, block m 2 is also resistant to the removal attack.
Removal attack resistance analysis
Unlike the Anti-SAT design in [15] , our proposed G-Anti-SAT block does not rely on additional measures, such as the withholding and entanglement obfuscation techniques [12] to resist the removal attack.
AppSAT attack resistance analysis
The reason that the AppSAT attack can effectively decrypt the Anti-SAT block is that for any randomly selected wrong key, there is only one input that can make the block output wrong. The corruptibility as defined in (5) is very low. For block m 1 with 16-bit input, |Lf T | = 2 14 and |Lg T | = 2 14 + 1. Since the total number of keys is 2 32 , testing every key can not be finished in practical time. Hence 500 keys are randomly selected in our test. Among these keys, there are 127 keys each of which has 16384 input patterns leading to the wrong output. For block m 2 , |Lf T | = 2 15 − 1 and |Lg T | = 2 15 + 1. Among the 500 random keys, there are 253 keys each of which has 32767 input patterns leading to the wrong output.
In order for the AppSAT to be successful, the portion of input queries leading to the wrong output needs to fall under a very small threshold in the order of 1 2 n . In block m 1 and m 2 , for a large portion of keys, the probability that an input query leads to the wrong output is much higher. As a result, our proposed designs are resistant to the AppSAT attack.
DISCUSSIONS
Our proposed G-Anti-SAT schemes enjoy great flexibility on the allowing f and g functions. In the two examples given in the previous section, the two functions are chosen so that their true set cardinalities are about the same in order to make the ADS value of the last gate close to zero, which is needed to resist the removal attack according to [17] . By changing the relative cardinalities of the two true sets, the ADS can be also tuned to other values.
For a given number of input bits, the larger the cardinalities of the two true sets, the higher corruptibility the output of the G-Anti-SAT block. In the case that the two functions are non-complementary, in order to guarantee the existence of right keys and lower complicated functions, the cardinalities of the two true sets can be at most around 2 n−2 for n-bit input G-Anti-SAT blocks. The block m 1 in the previous section is an example for this case. When the two functions are complementary, their cardinalities can be made equal to around 2 n−1 , as shown by block m 2 . Although the G-Anti-SAT designs with non-complementary functions have smaller true set cardinalities compared to those with complementary functions, both of them have a high percentage of inputs leading to high probability of getting the wrong output, which makes the AppSAT attack unsuccessful.
There is another attack scheme called the bypass attack [20] . The main idea of this attack is to construct a bypass circuit that inverts the wrong output and nullifies the effect of the wrong key. The complexity of the bypass circuit increases linearly with the number of DIPs that can exclude a wrong key. Our proposed G-Anti-SAT block can be inserted into existing circuits using the same two integration methods as for the Anti-SAT design. It was pointed out in [15] that the secure integration is better at resisting the SAT attack. However, in the Anti-SAT design, each key can be ruled out by one and exactly one DIP in the secure integration. This makes the Anti-SAT design vulnerable to the bypass attack. On the contrary, for a large portion of wrong keys, there are multiple DIPs that can exclude them in our G-Anti-SAT design. As a result, unlike the Anti-SAT block, our design is also resistant to the bypass attack.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, novel G-Anti-SAT schemes have been proposed by relaxing the constraints on the wrong key sets. Compared to prior designs, our schemes allow not only great flexibility on the two function blocks, but also noncomplementary functions. As a result, proper functions can be adopted to resist various attacks. In addition, methodologies using K-maps have been proposed to design the functions and finding the right keys. Experiments and analyses showed that the proposed designs with true sets of moderate and about equal cardinalities are immune to all existing attacks. Future work will monitor new attacks and extend our proposed designs.
APPENDIX A
In the case of Lf F ∪Lg F ⊂ X n , Lf T K f needs to be a subset of Lg F Kg in order to satisfy (14) . Let C be a subset of Lg F Kg that equals Lf T K f . Assume |C| = |Lf T K f | = m, and for elements C i ∈ C and −−−→ Lf T K f i ∈ Lf T K f (i = 1, 2, · · · , m)
Since C ⊂ Lg F Kg , according to the definition of Lg F Kg ,
Then the above equations can be rewritten as
Moving K g from the left side to the right side of the equations, it can be derived that
where K = K f ⊕ K g . Adding any two equations listed in (17) 
According to the definition of binary distance structure in (15) , (18) can be translated to Constraint 2.
